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ABSTRACT
Between 1905 and 1934 over 869 farmers in Owens Valley, California sold their land and associated
water rights to Los Angeles, 250 miles to the southwest. This agriculture-to-urban water transfer
increased Los Angeles' water supply by over 4 times, making the subsequent dramatic growth of the
semi-arid city possible, generating large economic returns. The exchange took water from a marginal
agricultural area and transferred it via the Los Angeles Aqueduct. No other sources of water became
available for the city until 1941 with the arrival of water from Hoover Dam via the California
Aqueduct. The Owens Valley transfer was the first and last, large-scale voluntary market exchange
of water from agriculture to urban. Despite gains to both parties from the re-allocation of water to
higher-valued  uses,  the  Owens  Valley  transfer  serves  today  as  a  metaphor,  cautioning  any
agricultural region against water sales to urban areas. In this paper I examine the bargaining involved
in the Owens Valley water transfer to determine why it was so contentious and became so notorious.
I focus on valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly, and third party effects. I also examine the impact
of the transfer on Owens Valley and Los Angeles land owners. The results suggest gains to both
groups. Broader conclusions for bargaining, when the aggregate gains from trade are enormous, but
distribution very skewed, are drawn.
Gary D. Libecap
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“It seems to us that the importance of the Owens River Project to the City of Los Angeles 
cannot be overestimated.” Los Angeles Board of Water Commissioners, Report on Water 
Supply (1906, 6). 
 
“Do you have any idea what this land would be worth with a steady water supply—About 
30 million more than they paid for it.”  J.J. Gittes (Jack Nicholson) referring to land in the 
San Fernando Valley, in the movie, Chinatown, 1974. 
 
“Probably nowhere in the history of any country has one community…adopted a policy 
…. which has wrought the havoc and produced the mental agony and suffering that the 
policy of the City of Los Angeles and their representatives has produced in a little 
community in which we live.” W.W. Yandell President, Ione Seymoure, Secretary, 
Farmers Ditch Company, Owens Valley, 1924
1 
   
“….farmers remain suspicious of the ‘Owens valley syndrome’…The ‘theft’ of its 
water…in the early 20
th century has become the most notorious water grab by any city 
anywhere…the whole experience has poisoned subsequent attempts to persuade farmers 
to trade their water to thirsty cities.” The Economist, July 19, 2003, 15. 
 
Introduction. 
The most rapid population growth in the U.S. is in the urban areas of the semi-
arid West.  This growth is fueled by shifts from an economy based on agriculture and 
extractive industries to ones based on service and technology.  Most western cities, such 
as Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Tucson, do not have sufficient local 
water sources to supply this growth in urban demand. Accordingly, there are efforts to 
acquire water from agriculture, where approximately 70-75 percent of western water is 
allocated. But this process generally is slow and controversial, resulting in sharp 
differences in urban and agricultural water prices.
2 For instance, groundwater for farming 
near Marana, Pima County, Arizona costs approximately $25 per acre-foot 
(approximately 325,000 gallons), whereas the same water for urban use costs $200.  In 
recent efforts to secure Imperial Irrigation District water, San Diego offered $225 per 
acre foot for water that farmers used for $15.50.
3    3 
This paper explores the problems of negotiating water transfers from agricultural 
to urban uses by analyzing the Owens Valley water transfer to Los Angeles between 1905 
and 1934. The Owens Valley transfer to Los Angeles is the first example of a large-scale, 
market-based exchange of water rights in the American West. Unfortunately, it is also 
unquestionably the most notorious. It is held up by critics as an example of water theft, as 
the above quote from the Economist suggests, and of all that can go wrong from 
transferring water from rural to urban areas.   
Between 1905 and 1934 representatives of the Los Angeles Board of Water and 
Power Commissioners and some 869 farm and ranch owners and 825 town lot owners 
negotiated the sale of land and appurtenant water rights. Under the appropriative water 
rights doctrine that exists in the western U.S., water rights can be secured through land 
purchases and the water transferred out of the drainage area.  By 1934, the agency had 
acquired 95 percent of the agricultural acreage and 88 percent of the town properties in 
the Owens Valley to obtain the region’s water.
4   
Owens Valley water was transported to Los Angeles via the Los Angeles 
Aqueduct, which became one of the nation’s largest public works projects at the time, 
second only to the Panama Canal.
5  In 1920, seven years after the aqueduct was 
completed, Owens Valley provided a flow of 283 cubic feet per second of water to the 
city, whereas the entire local Los Angeles basin water supply provided a flow of just 68 
cubic feet per second.
6 The water brought about the growth of Los Angeles from 250,000 
people in 1900 to 2,208,492 by 1930. The city became the largest on the West Coast and 
hosted the X
th Olympic Games in 1932.
7 The additional water also was the basis for 
dramatic increases in land values in the San Fernando Valley, in some cases from $20 to   4 
$2,000 per acre.  By 1920, Los Angeles County, for a time, became the nation’s largest 
agricultural county in terms of value of production.
8 The gravity flow of water from 
Owens Valley to the city allowed for power generation, and the Los Angeles Department 
of Water and Power became the largest municipal electric utility in the country.
9   
Despite all of the apparent benefits of the water exchange, the standard 
assessment is decidedly negative.  It is generally viewed as an unequal exchange due to 
an imbalanced struggle between representatives of a politically-powerful and wealthy city 
against small, rural land owners.  The alleged outcome was destruction of the valley’s 
agricultural economy and the desertification of its lands (Wood, 1973, 8; Reisner, 1986, 
60-107; Kahrl, 1982, 38; 387, Kahrl 2000, 255; Ewan, 2000, 42; Wheeler, 2002).
10 Other 
authors have a more balanced view of the transaction, noting the valley’s limited 
agricultural potential and the impact of the water transfer on the growth of Los Angeles 
(Nadeau, 1950, 126-28; Hoffman, 1982, xviii-xiv; Vorster, 1992; Walton, 1992, 192-97; 
and Sauder, 1994, 124-34, 151-64). 
 Although difficult to test, the legacy of the Owens Valley water transfer appears 
to have been harmful for contemporary development of water markets. Ostrom (1971, 
449) noted that the experience in Owens Valley deterred subsequent efforts to re-allocate 
water from the Feather River and other areas in Northern California to urban centers in 
the south, and Haddad (2000, xv) argued that the “Ghost of Owens Valley” inhibited all 
proposed water transfers from rural areas to cities in the West.  Hanak (2003, 5, 123) 
pointed to the “devastation” to the Owens Valley economy as motivating county 
restrictions on water transfers in California. The 1974 movie, “Chinatown,” staring Jack 
Nicholson and Faye Dunaway, dramatized conspiracies involving Owens Valley water   5 
and land speculation in Los Angeles, adding to a popular notion that the outcome of the 
exchange was not a positive one.
11  
The questions that arise, then, are what were the sources of the bargaining 
conflicts between land owners and the city of Los Angeles that raised the transaction 
costs of agreement, delaying settlement and giving the land and water exchanges such 
negative notoriety? What was the ultimate impact on the valley?   
Addressing these questions is the objective of this paper.  The analysis focuses on 
bargaining between Owens Valley land owners (mostly small farmers) and the Los 
Angeles Board of Water and Power Commissioners (the Water Board).  The five-member 
board was appointed by the Mayor and charged with securing and distributing a 
dependable water supply that would support the growth of the city.  Most of the land 
acquisitions were financed through bond sales.  There were five bond issues between 
1905 and 1934 to fund infrastructure construction and land and water rights purchases in 
Owens Valley, and the Board was constrained by available funding and subject to 
oversight by the Mayor and taxpayers for efficient fiscal management.
12 The critical time 
period is 1923-34, when most properties were purchased and when most of the 
contentious negotiations took place.
13 Although the Los Angeles Water Board sought to 
buy most irrigated farm lands in1923, final agreement with the last and most valuable 
properties did not take place until 11 years later, 1934.  The task then is to explain why 
the negotiations took so long to complete and why they were so rancorous, leaving such a 
negative legacy.   
The analysis makes use of detailed records—letters, reports, memorandums from 
1905 to 1934 between the Los Angeles Water Board, its land agents, and land owners in   6 
the Owens Valley as deposited in the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
Archives.
14  These documents describe the bargaining history between the Board and 
farmers as they negotiated over land and water rights. Bargaining positions, strategies, 
and key issues of contention are described in the data.  Additionally, there is a 
compilation of 869 farm land purchases, including year of purchase, amount paid, 
location of property, name of owner, as well as other property characteristics.  These data 
are used in the statistical analysis.  Other data sets exist for sellers’ pool membership and 
for town lot sales.  
The information provides a rich basis for examining the bargaining conflicts that 
occurred in Owens Valley in a manner that has not been done previously. The added 
transaction costs of negotiating land and water rights sales in the early 20
th century 
centered on three issues: disputes over valuation of property, bi-lateral monopoly, and 
third-party effects.  Insights from the analysis not only explain why the Owens Valley 
negotiations were so lengthy and rancorous, but also why current efforts in the early 21
st 
century to transfer water from agriculture to urban and environmental uses in the semi-
arid West likely will involve similar problems. 
II. Background: An Overview of the Owens Valley Water Transfer:  Valuation, Bi-
lateral Monopoly, and Third-Party Effects.  
 
  Table 1 provides a brief, chronological summary of the Owens Valley water 
transfer to Los Angeles and the negotiations between the Los Angeles Water Board and 
land owners for land and water rights.  
Table 1 
The search for additional water in Los Angeles began early. Between 1880 and 
1900, the population of Los Angeles grew five fold, from 50,393 people to 250,000, and   7 
given the city’s climate, links via the intercontinental railroads, and position as a major 
West Coast port, prospects for continued growth seemed promising, except for the 
absence of sufficient water.
15  The city was in a semi-arid region where annual 
precipitation not only was extremely variable, but averaged just 14.62 inches, whereas 
Chicago, for example had mean rainfall of 34.12 inches.
16 Los Angeles relied upon the 
meager Los Angeles river watershed rather than rainfall for its water supply.  But by the 
turn of the century, there was growing concern among city boosters that more water had 
to be found if the city were to achieve prominence on the west coast.
17  And there was 
water, 250 miles northeast in the Owens Valley on the eastern slopes of the Sierras.  
Between the Owen River’s flow and ground sources in the valley, there was a supply of 
some 37 million acre feet of water available, about the same as that held in Lake Mead 
today.
18  
The Owens Valley was approximately 120 miles by 2 to 6miles bisected by the 
Owens River that eventually dumped into an alkaline, desert sump, Owens Lake.  In 1920 
prior to major land purchases by Los Angeles, there were 7,031 people in the area on 
farms and in five towns—Bishop, Big Pine, Laws, Independence, and Lone Pine.
19 There 
were 140,000 acres of farm land in the valley, of which 65,163 acres were irrigated, and 
20,906 acres were in crops in 1920, mostly alfalfa, some grains, and small orchards 
(apple and pear).
20Livestock was the principal agricultural product. The elevation of the 
valley (ranging from 3,600 to 4,300 feet), short growing season (150 days), alkaline soil, 
and limited access to markets constrained its agricultural potential, and its production was 
more characteristic of Great Basin agriculture, than of elsewhere in California.
21 Figure 1 
indicates the location of Owens Valley northeast of Los Angeles.   8 
Figure 1 
The lands of primary interest to the Water Board were those that carried the most 
water and were either properties riparian to the Owens River and some feeder streams or 
more importantly, organized as part of formal irrigation ditch companies.  The major 
ditches in Owens Valley were the McNally Ditch, Bishop Creek Ditch, the Owens River 
Canal, the Big Pine Canal, the Rawson Ditch, and Farmers Ditch.
22 Approximately 
49,000 acres of land were associated with these ditches, about 77 percent of all farmland 
in the region.
23 In total, there were 110 miles of primary and secondary ditches lacing the 
north valley where most agriculture took place.
24 The construction of ditches required 
cooperative investments so that farmers joined to incorporate ditch companies and to 
place joint appropriative water claims.  The amount of water held by each farmer 
depended on the number of shares he owned in the ditch company.  Once the Water 
Board completed purchase of a farm located on a ditch, its allocation could be released to 
flow instead down the river to the aqueduct.  
Between 1905 and 1921 the Water Board purchased land in the southern part of 
Owens Valley to acquire the right of way for the aqueduct as well as riparian claims to 
excess water that had not been diverted for irrigation in the northern, most agricultural 
part of the valley. Through 1921, this water supply was thought sufficient to meet 
anticipated demand in Los Angeles and to justify the construction of the aqueduct. These 
land and water rights purchases did not interfere with irrigated farming. Southern Owens 
Valley lands were mostly desert and average purchase prices ranged from $1.25 to 
$23.86 per acre. By contrast, mean purchase price for lands bought later in the north was 
$198 per acre.
 25 Once the city’s purchases of land and water rights in the southern Owens   9 
Valley were announced, successful, but contentious elections for two bond issues for 
$24.5 million to buy land and construct an aqueduct were held in 1905 and 1907.
26 The 
elections were controversial because of suspicions that land speculation in the San 
Fernando Valley was the primary motivation for Owens Valley water, not impending 
shortages.
27  
The reallocation of water brought dramatic property value gains in Los Angeles.
28 
Although Los Angeles subsequently grew more rapidly than predicted, requiring more 
water for urban demand, much of the initial water went to irrigate lands in the San 
Fernando Valley.
29When the aqueduct began flowing in 1913 it supplied 4 to 5 times 
domestic urban demand, but under the appropriative water rights doctrine the water had 
to be in beneficial use in order for Los Angeles to retain ownership.
30  Accordingly, water 
was made available for farming in the San Fernando Valley, and irrigated acreage in Los 
Angeles County expanded by over 124,000 acres.  The Board provided Owens Valley 
water only to areas that agreed to be annexed by the city, and this provision led to the 
dramatic increase in the size of the Los Angeles by over 325 square miles.  Gradually, as 
urban water demand increased, agricultural use of Owens Valley water in Los Angeles 
declined. 
At the same time that Los Angeles was planning to acquire Owens Valley water, 
its residents were seeking a federal Reclamation Service project for drainage and 
increased irrigation. The Reclamation project would have increased agricultural 
productivity in the valley by reducing the alkalinity of the soil and increasing the local 
water supply for farming. Ultimately, however, the Reclamation project was in 
competition with Los Angeles for Owens Valley water.  The Reclamation Service   10 
investigated prospects in the valley beginning in 1903, but suspended activities in 1905 
and the Interior Department cancelled the project in 1907.
31 During that time, Los 
Angeles’ officials moved aggressively to secure access to federal lands for right-of-way 
and for reservoir storage sites for the aqueduct. The view in Owens Valley was that the 
political influence of Los Angeles had doomed the project.
32  
Much is made of this in the historical literature as evidence of the city’s political 
power and lack of concern for the welfare of the valley’s residents.
33 But recent research 
indicates that the Reclamation Service’s decision not to invest in Owens Valley was 
based on limited funds and more favorable sites elsewhere in the West.
34 In any event, 
the loss of the reclamation project and the diversion of Owens Valley water to irrigation 
in the San Fernando Valley, where huge capital gains were earned, caused resentment 
and reduced trust among Owens Valley farmers toward the Water Board, thereby raising 
the transaction costs of subsequent bargaining.
35   
Beginning in 1923 in the face of drought and rising population growth in Los 
Angeles, the Water Board began to purchase lands in the more agricultural and densely 
populated part of Owens Valley, and these negotiations are the source of the bargaining 
conflicts that characterize the Owens Valley transfer. From1923 through 1934, the Board 
moved aggressively, securing an additional 863 agricultural properties covering 145,867 
acres.
36 1,300 town parcels also were purchased beginning in February 1931 using bond 
revenues.
37   
Not all bond elections were successful, and the Water Board, charged with 
supplying Los Angeles with dependable water, was under scrutiny by water ratepayers 
and city voters.
38 At least two proposed bond issues in 1917 and 1929 were defeated by   11 
Los Angeles voters, and as the situation in Owens Valley became more controversial, 
funding of city purchases may have become more problematic politically.
39 Accordingly, 
throughout the period, the Board was concerned with securing as much land and water as 
possible with available funds.  
In negotiations between land owners and the Water Board there were three 
general classes of problems, although they overlapped:  valuation disputes, bi-lateral 
monopoly conflicts, and third-party effects. 
Valuation Disputes. 
There were two conflicts in determining prices for Owens Valley lands. One was 
the basis for general valuation of farm properties--whether the estimated water supply on 
a farm should be valued as an input in agricultural production in Owens Valley or as an 
input to land value increases in Los Angeles.  The second was the determination of the 
value of any particular property when farms were heterogeneous.  In terms of the first 
issue, the Water Board wanted to use Owens Valley farm values in determining the prices 
it offered land owners, whereas land owners wanted to use Los Angeles land and water 
values in determining the prices they demanded for their properties.  For example, before 
the Board, one land owner claimed that she priced according to “the comparative value of 
what that water is worth to you….because we know you want water and not the 
land…that is what you want and all you want….”
40 Given observed land values in Los 
Angeles after the arrival of Owens Valley water, relative to those associated with 
agriculture in Owens Valley, there were considerable gaps between offered (bid) and 
demanded (ask) prices.      12 
The valuation of particular properties was a continuing and important source of 
contention because the value agreed to for a particular property determined the owners 
“share” of the aggregate gains of the water exchange.  As discussed in Section V, these 
aggregate gains from trade, especially in Los Angeles, were extremely large, and each 
farmer in Owens Valley wanted as large a portion of them as possible.   
Owens Valley properties varied in value according to inherent land fertility, 
access to water, topography, other growing conditions, and farm size. Each land owner 
had the most complete information about the agricultural potential of his property, but at 
the same time, had incentive to exaggerate its value.  Accordingly, to assemble offer 
prices, the Board relied upon a committee of expert appraisers to assimilate local farm 
price information.  To reduce disputes with the land owners, the Water Board selected a 
committee that would be viewed as credible and acceptable to both parties. 
In 1925, the Water Board assembled a special Appraisal Committee of “three of 
the leading citizens of Owens Valley:” George W. Naylor, Chair of the Board of 
Supervisors of Inyo County, V.L. Jones, Inyo Assessor, and U.G. Clark, former county 
Assessor.
41  Even so, since the appraisal committee was employed by the Board, it was 
viewed with suspicion among land owners.  During negotiations with some farmers in 
1926,  the credibility of the committee’s prices was questioned:  “You hired that 
committee; we had nothing to say about it…if you people hire these men, you expect 
them to go into the field and do as you tell them don’t you?” Both the appraisals and the 
committee often were rejected: “They have been your committee for a long time. Let us 
forget them.”
42    13 
During the valuation process, Board land agents would collect information about 
each farm—location, water rights, amount of irrigated land in cultivation, pasture, 
“brush” land, orchards, improvements, and submit the information to the Appraisal 
Committee.  The Committee, in turn, would compare this information with that for 
similar farms that had already been purchased to arrive at an “appraised value.” The 
Water Board generally used a fixed multiple, usually 4.1 times appraisal value, to 
determine its offer or bid price.
43 The Board wanted its offer prices to be based “on the 
fair average prices which the city had paid for substantially similar property in that 
region.”
44 It repeatedly resisted adjusting prices beyond what it had offered for 
comparable lands in an area.  Further, in 1926 in asking the Appraisal Committee to 
determine offer values for properties under consideration, one of the Board’s land agents 
stated: “It is also to be understood that these properties are to be appraised in the same 
manner and on the same basis that you have appraised other properties of substantially 
the same character and in accordance with previous values….”
45  
Nevertheless, land owners challenged the committee’s appraised values, and 
called instead for binding arbitration in price disputes, using outside arbitrators.  
Challenges were based on disputes both regarding the relevant comparison properties, as 
well as assessment of individual farm characteristics.  For example, one owner, who had 
been offered $3,100 for her property, complained that a neighbour had been offered 
$10,500, even though he had 1.25 acres less than her, with only 2 inches of water from 
the ditch, while she had 3 inches.
46  Another wanted her land appraised against a different 
group of properties, selecting five farms whose owners had received more than she had 
been offered.
47The gaps between the bid and ask prices could be sometimes be very large.    14 
Owners of the 160-acre Parker ranch asked for $30,000 for the property and 
improvements. Land agents for the Water Board offered $11,496. At least part of the gap 
was based on the absence of comparison purchases in the area of properties with similar 
characteristics in order to arrive at an appraisal. Although the owners lowered their ask 
price to approximately $23,000, negotiations languished for at least four years and there 
is no record of the farm being purchased by the city.
48  
In another case, in 1927 J.T. Otey rejected a bid of $11,200 for his 50-acre farm, 
claiming that the Board’s assessment undervalued the water and improvements on his 
property (“It cannot be denied that, after all, water is the chief factor which determines 
that value of land”). Using prices paid by the Board for neighboring properties with and 
without water, he estimated the added value of water, incorporated it into is calculation, 
and countered with an ask price of $18,338.56. He then held out for two years, selling the 
farm to the city for $19,000.
49  
In 1925, farmers who were in conflict with the Board over price asked that the 
two sides set up a “valuation commission” to resolve their valuation conflicts, saying that 
“no more honest attitude can be taken by either party.”  Even the special Appraisal 
Committee agreed, but the Board rejected this offer, claiming that “valuation by third 
party would mean abandonment of purchase plan adopted with concurrence of your 
committee and thus far followed in dealing with your neighbors.”
50 
Agreement on property valuation also was complicated by a lack of trust on both 
sides.  Board officials viewed land owners as attempting to fleece taxpayers with 
exorbitant price demands. Land owners, by contrast, viewed the Board as attempting to 
undervalue their lands while property values in the San Fernando Valley were rising   15 
rapidly. This limited trust meant that neither party held the other’s pricing claims as 
credible or honest.  This condition increased the transaction costs of negotiation and 
lengthened the time necessary for agreement.   
Although much of the Owens Valley bargaining record involves conflicts over 
price between the city and land owners, with the latter claiming that they were underpaid, 
there is evidence of concern that the city was paying too much for land. For example, a 
land buyer John Merrill asserted in 1927 that while the city had paid an average of $200 
per acre for Owens Valley lands thus far, the lands could have been secured for $50 to 
$75 per acre for a total expenditure of $5 million rather than $12 million.
51 The 
Hollywood Daily Citizen ran an editorial objecting to any payment for town properties 
beyond appraised values.
52 These allegations were of concern to the agency and its ability 
within the political climate of Los Angeles to raise funds through additional bond issues. 
Bi-lateral Monopoly Disputes. 
Disputes over valuation took place, at least for some properties, within a bi-lateral 
monopoly context. The Los Angeles Water Board generally was the only purchaser of 
Owens Valley lands and water rights.  Once the Los Angeles aqueduct was constructed 
for over $23,000,000, the city had a large fixed, immobile investment that depended upon 
Owens Valley water. After 1923 with drought depleting the original flow of the aqueduct 
and urban demand growing rapidly, the Water Board was anxious to acquire properties in 
northern Owens Valley for their water rights.  Hence, while Board officials could walk 
away from stalled negotiations with one land owner, they could not walk away from 
Owens Valley as a whole.  Land owners formed sellers’ pools to collude in their 
negotiations with the Board. Although, these pools never included all of the farmers in   16 
Owens Valley, they did involve those with the most water. Under these circumstances, 
bi-lateral monopoly conditions existed. 
Bi-lateral monopolies have indeterminate pricing outcomes because they depend 
upon the relative bargaining power of the parties. Each party has incentive to 
misrepresent its position in order to extract a greater share of the gains of trade in such 
negotiations, and there is little competitive pressure to force more accurate information 
revelation.  According, bi-lateral monopoly negotiations often break down and take a 
long time to complete. 
The farmers who held shares in ditch companies had a ready organizational tool 
for colluding in their negotiations with the Los Angeles Water Board that was not 
available to those who were not on ditches and were scattered across the valley.  Three 
sellers’ pools were formed along three of the ditches: the Keough pool on the Owens 
River Canal with 23-30 members, the Watterson pool of about 20 members on Bishop 
Creek Ditch, and the Cashbaugh pool of 43-48 members on Bishop Creek Ditch.
53 These 
pools were negotiating groups, dominated by the largest land owner. The pool leaders 
were recognized as bargaining agents for all pool members by the Water Board.
54 
Members may have had to pay a commission to pool leaders for any higher prices they 
received.
55  At most, the pools involved about a quarter of the farms along the major 
ditches in Owens Valley, but probably much of the irrigated acreage. The limited 
numbers likely reflected efforts to maintain more homogeneous negotiating groups, as 
well as the aggressive efforts of the Water Board to buy ditch properties before they 
joined a pool.    17 
The Keough pool was the most concentrated and tightly organized group with a 
Herfindahl index (based on farm size) of 1,583. The Watterson pool had a Herfindahl 
index of 1,163, the Cashbaugh, 410, and non-pool, ditch farmers, 216.
56 Negotiations 
between the Water Board and pool members, especially those in the Keough pool, were 
among the most contentious and drawn out in the Owens Valley.   
The Board paid $1,389,364 to buy out the properties in the Cashbaugh pool 
between 1924 and 1927.  The largest land and share owner in the pool, however, William 
Cashbaugh held out through 1927, and received a 21 percent premium over the city’s 
initial offer price of $145,180 or $174,680.
57 The most successful pool was led by Karl 
Keough with 4,482 acres (60 percent) of the 7,862 acres on the Owens River Canal. In 
1926, the Keough pool demanded $2,100,000 for its properties, and the Board first 
offered $1,025,000 and then increased it to$1,250,000.  The pool countered with a price 
of $1,600,000, which was rejected by the Board.
58 Price negotiations for Owens River 
Canal properties, both in and out of the pool, continued on and between 1925 and 1931. 
By the end of 1927, 60 percent of the 4,837 shares in the canal company were acquired 
by the Board, but the remaining 40 percent held by pool members were not secured until 
1931. G.L. Wallace offered his lands in 1926 for $417 per acre, while the city countered 
with $254 per acre.  Final agreement was not reached with him until 1931 at $466 per 
acre.
59 
Pool leaders resorted to violence to pressure the Board to meet their price 
demands when negotiations broke down, threatening the security of the city’s water 
supply. Between 1924 and 1931 the aqueduct and city wells were repeatedly dynamited, 
although the aqueduct was never seriously damaged, which was never the objective.
60   18 
These episodes of violence, labelled “California’s little Civil War” by the press, attracted 
state and national attention, and compelled the Board to reach agreement with remaining 
property owners on price.
61 The Board correctly viewed the dynamiting as a negotiating 
tactic, but at the same time, it was extremely worried about disruption of the aqueduct 
flow.
62Indeed, in November 1924, the Alabama Gates spillway was seized and opened, 
dumping the water into the desert and leaving the aqueduct dry. The Board responded by 
increasing its efforts to secure remaining Owens Valley lands.
63 
By contrast, sales agreements with non-ditch, non-pool farm owners appear to 
have gone smoothly. Many of the 869 farm properties purchased between 1916 and 1934 
were not on ditches or in pools. In the data set used below of 595 farms, 228 were not on 
ditches.  These farms were purchased for their ground water, and the Board installed 
pumps to access it. Non-ditch properties tended to be the least productive in the region 
and they received the lowest prices. Even so, there is no evidence in the record of discord 
in those negotiations. The Water Board reported that “the prices paid, with few 
exceptions, have been entirely satisfactory to the seller.”
64  
In some cases, the Board was forced to purchase non-ditch properties in order to 
avoid a court ruling under Santa Barbara v. Riverside, 186 California, 7, 15 (1921) that 
could stop all ground water pumping in the region for export of water. Under that ruling 
any land owner who could demonstrate damage due to the drawdown of the water table 
from pumping and export of water by another could secure an injunction halting all such 
pumping.  To maintain its pumps, the Board quickly purchased properties when pumping 
injunctions were threatened by land owners.
65   19 
Once the Water Board completed purchase of a farm, its ditch water allocation, 
riparian claim, or groundwater could be released to flow down the river to the aqueduct.  
If Water Board land agents could not reach agreement with one land owner, they would 
turn to another. Holdouts could receive higher prices, but if the Board concluded that 
negotiations had reached an impasse, that there were no longer bond funds available to 
complete further purchases, or that the city had sufficient water rights and no more were 
required, then these holdouts could bear additional costs.  Besides the opportunity cost of 
the lost sale revenue, holdouts who were on ditches could be left isolated with higher 
ditch maintenance and operating costs, since the city did not contribute once the ditch 
water was released from its properties.  Weeds and insects from no-longer cultivated 
properties also could infect remaining neighboring farms.
66It was alleged by some 
farmers that the Board engaged in a checker boarding strategy, buying properties around 
holdouts to force them to sell. There is no clear evidence of this or that this strategy made 
holdouts worse off. As shown below, farmers who delayed sale to the city earned more, 
all things equal. Moreover, throughout the negotiating period, the Board held to its 
overall pricing strategy of paying the same prices for comparable properties.
67   
Third-Party Effects. 
As Los Angeles purchased properties in Owens Valley and took them out of 
irrigated agriculture, there were complaints that this action was hurting the local economy 
and damaging property values within the five towns. The magnitudes of the effects were 
disputed. Merchants claimed to have lost 1/3 of their trade due to the decline in the 
agricultural economy.
68 The general fall in agricultural commodity prices in the 1920s 
also hurt the community, but this effect was difficult to separate from those resulting   20 
from the Water Board’s purchase of lands and export of water.  For example, the value of 
Inyo County crops fell from $1,503,195 to $791,257 between 1920 and 1924, a fall of 47 
percent. This decline, however, occurred prior to most of the property purchases in the 
valley by Los Angeles. Further during that same five-year period, the number of farms in 
the valley fell only 7 ½ percent, from 521 to 482, unlikely enough to account for the 
observed fall in the value of agricultural production.
69 Nevertheless, town property 
owners blamed the actions of the Water Board for the deterioration in economic 
conditions. The Board countered by pointing to the beneficial effects of its investments in 
the valley to develop water and power sites and the growth of recreational activities from 
Los Angeles due to construction of new roads. Indeed, automobile registration and bank 
deposits in the region increased.
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California State Board of Equalization annual reports on the total value of all 
property within municipalities (real estate, personal, monetary) support the claims of the 
Water Board. In 1920, prior to major purchases in the agricultural part of the valley near 
Bishop, the total value of property in Bishop was listed as $1,027,792.  By 1929 it had 
risen to $1,355,666 (a gain of 32 percent), and in 1930 with the onslaught of the 
depression was $1,228,709, a gain of 20 percent over 1920.
71  Any negative third-party 
effects may have been quite small.  
Nevertheless, in 1925, the Owens Valley Reparations Committee demanded either 
that the Board pay $5,500,000 in reparations for the loss in town lot value or that the city 
purchase the properties for $12,000,000.
72 Not only were the prices for town properties 
well above what Los Angeles had been paying for other lands, but they carried few or no 
water rights.  Hence, the Board was uncertain that it had the legal authority under the city   21 
charter to purchase such lands, which did not “supply the City with an adequate supply of 
pure water...”
73  Members of the Los Angeles Water Board concluded that they would be 
personally liable if they made such payments.
74 There were disagreements over valuation 
of the town lots, given both the export of water and the deterioration in the national 
agricultural economy in the late 1920s.   
Legislation was enacted by the California Legislature in 1925, at the behest of 
Inyo County and other rural legislators, requiring cities to compensate for damages to 
businesses and property owners when water was taken from the drainage area.
75 “An Act 
Providing for and Relating to Damage Resulting from or Caused by the Acquisition of a 
Water Supply or Taking, Diverting, and Transporting of Water from a Watershed…by a 
Municipal Corporation…” passed overwhelmingly with 78 percent yes votes in the 
Assembly and 88 percent in the state Senate. The greatest support came from legislators 
from Northern California, who not only were more likely to represent rural areas, but also 
were concerned about the growing political influence of Southern California.  Support 
from Southern California legislators was more tepid, with 50 percent voting no or 
abstaining in the Assembly.
76  
The statute added pressure on the Board to buy the town properties or be faced 
with hard-to-measure-and-agree-upon reparations demands. Indeed, the Bishop and Big 
Pine Reparations Committees presented the Board with 548 property damage claims for 
$2,813,355.
77 Los Angeles officials held off the purchase of town lots until there was a 
state Supreme Court ruling in 1929 that authorized the purchase of town properties by the 
Water Board. After that, negotiations between the city and town lot owners were 
rancorous, requiring various appraisals, offers and counter offers.
78 The Water Board was   22 
obligated to buy the properties and town owners knew that.  The Board, however, was 
constrained by available bond funds.  
A Committee of Ten was set up with five representatives each from the towns and 
five members of a Special Owens Valley Committee of the Board to determine prices. 
But the property value appraisals prepared by the Board’s land agents were rejected by 
the town representatives.  Negotiators for the towns offered counter appraisals that raised 
proposed values in the towns of Laws and Independence by 45 to 50 percent, in Bishop 
by 120 percent, and Big Pine by 60 percent.  Members of the California legislature who 
owned properties in the towns threatened new investigations of the city’s purchasing 
practices unless the new appraisals were accepted.
79 Ultimately, a compromise was 
reached and Los Angeles paid $5,798,780 to 824 owners for 1,300 town parcels, most of 
which brought little or no additional water to the city.
80The prices paid were based on 
1923 values that existed prior to major purchases by the city in the valley, and they did 
not reflect the 1929 agricultural depression that was affecting rural land values 
throughout the country.
81 Funds to buy town lots and remaining agricultural properties in 
Owens Valley required a special bond election for $38,800,000 that passed in 1930.
82   
In the following section an analytical framework is provided to guide statistical 
analysis of the purchase of farm properties.  The data on individual town properties are 
too limited to allow for the similar analysis.  
III. Analytical Framework.  
Figure 2 illustrates the bargaining setting facing land owners in Owens Valley and 
representatives of the Los Angeles Water Board.  The vertical axis represents the price 
per acre for land in Owens Valley and the horizontal axis represents acres of land in the   23 
valley. Valley land is heterogeneous with respect to its agricultural potential, which is a 
function of inherent soil fertility, local growing conditions, such as elevation, and access 
to water.  Along the horizontal axis, land ranges from the least productive at the origin to 
more productive, moving to the right. The actual, value of true productivity of each acre 
of land is shown by ST, which has a positive slope, reflecting rising agricultural potential, 
and hence, greater farming value along the horizontal axis.  The determinants of ST for a 
particular acre of land are known by farmer, and this supply schedule represents the 
minimum that an owner would have to receive from the Water Board in order to sell.  
The Water Board in contrast, has less complete information about the true agricultural 
value of the land. Its Appraisal Board infers the value of productivity from assembled 
farm characteristics, observed output, and comparisons with similar properties.  It also 
projects the amount of water associated with any land from shares of irrigation ditch 
water, any riparian rights to estimated stream flows, and anticipated potential to pump 
groundwater.  
The Water Board uses information from the Board’s appraisal to prepare per-acre 
offer prices S2. These offer prices rise for lands of greater expected inherent fertility and 
water. The schedule represents the Board’s willingness to pay for land in Owens 
Valley.
83  Farmers, who do not accept the Board’s offer, counter with per-acre demand 
prices S1, based on what they believe to be the value of water in Los Angeles.
84  
This framework sets up the bargaining situation, with at least some land owners 
demanding higher prices along S1 and Water Board officials offering lower prices along 
S2.    24 
In negotiations, land owners have the option of accepting the offer price or 
rejecting it and holding out for their higher demand price. The expected return from 
holding out is:  
(1) N = [Pr S1 + (1- Pr ) ST] - S2,  
where Pr is the probability of successfully receiving the higher price.  Pr varies across 
owners and depends on the likelihood that during negotiations new information will 
reveal the true value of productivity of their land, as well as the ability of owners to 
collude.   
  Equation (1) implies that each farmer compares the Board’s original offer price 
with the expected value of holding out, which is determined by the probability of getting 
the higher price plus the probability of getting a price based instead on the land’s true 
productivity. Hence, the expected value of the holdout is a function of Pr and the gap 
between S1 and ST.  
(2) If S2 ￿ Pr￿ S1 + (1- Pr) ST, which applies for some farmers with land within the 
range O AM in the Figure, then the Board’s offer is accepted. Whether or not (2) holds in 
this region depends upon the value of Pr.  For low values of  Pr, which would be the case 
for scattered, unorganized properties that could not easily collude and where production 
is limited and easily observed (low valued, desert areas), (2) will describe the situation 
facing farmers and the Board’s offer will be accepted. There is no hold out and no 
negotiating conflict.
85  
(3) If S2 < Pr￿ S1 + (1- Pr) ST, there will be hold-outs and two bargaining 
possibilities. Where ST > S1, beyond A
* in the Figure, the farmer will never sell because 
the value of the true agricultural productivity of the land exceeds any possible price that   25 
the Board would pay. Between AM and A
*, however, farmers will bargain over price, 
rejecting S2, but seeking S1.  In the negotiations, there will be disagreements over 
valuation, the difference between the land’s true productivity and the Board’s offer price, 
EC, as well as battles over the rents received in Los Angeles from Owens Valley water, 
DE.  These properties will be the center of bargaining disputes in the valley.  Since the 
aqueduct’s capacity is reached with cumulative land purchases (and water) at AA, 
negotiations to fill it will be in the contested region.  
In negotiations with farmers in the contested region, the Water Board would seek 
to stay on S2, adhering to a pricing rule that pays the same price for similar properties, but 
raising prices for lands of higher expected productivity.
 86 The Board has two reasons for 
this objective.  One is that in negotiations with any farmer, the Board has to credibly 
commit not to offer higher prices to others with similar properties.  Failure to do so 
would make it very difficult to complete negotiations with any owner.  The second is that 
the Board would not want to set precedents by raising prices for some properties above 
those paid for other comparable lands.  The former would provide a new valuation 
baseline to be used land owners in subsequent price negotiations. The precedent of 
raising baseline prices would push the Board’s payments higher, along a marginal supply 
cost curve MSC in the Figure, more quickly exhausting its bond revenues, perhaps 
without filling the aqueduct, which was its objective.    
If farmers in the region AM A
* successfully colluded, then bi-lateral monopoly 
conditions would prevail, making final prices indeterminate, higher than S2 and generally 
higher than ST, but lower than S1, depending on the relative bargaining power of the two 
parties.   26 
This framework yields the following testable implications about the time of 
purchase, reflecting hold out actions, and prices paid for land:  
A.  The Water Board will seek to buy the most productive lands with the most 
water earliest to fill the aqueduct and offer the highest prices for such lands. 
B.  At the same time, land owners with the most productive land and the most 
water will hold out, delaying purchase to receive higher prices. 
C.  Land owners who collude will hold out the longest and receive the highest 
prices, all else equal.  
D.  Land owners with the least productive land and least water will receive the 
lowest prices. 
 
A related bargaining implication is that in negotiations with farmers, the Water Board 
would seek to adhere to a pricing rule that paid the same price for all similar properties.  
These implications are used to guide the empirical analysis.  The data include a). 
final sales price/acre; b). cultivation share of total farm land—an indication of inherent 
fertility and access to water because cultivation in this semi-arid region depends upon soil 
quality, water, and local growing conditions; c). acre feet of water/acre transferred with 
the land; d). existence of riparian water rights; e). location—whether or not the farm is 
part of an organized ditch,  and f). membership in a sellers’ pool.    
IV. Empirical Analysis of Bargaining for the Transfer of Land and Water Rights: 
Year of Purchase and Price Paid Per Acre. 
 
The data set of farm properties purchased between 1916 and 1934 by the Los 
Angeles Water Board includes 869 observations.  Dropping those properties less than ten 
acres as not being farms, but town lots (analyzed separately elsewhere) as well as 
dropping incomplete entries leaves 595 observations.  Of those 367 farms were on ditches 
and 228 were not on ditches, but scattered throughout Owens Valley.  Table 2 provides 
mean values for farm property owners in Owens Valley by various classifications. 
Table 2   27 
 As indicated by the mean values in the table, farms on ditches sold for higher 
prices per acre than did those that were not on a ditch.  They included a larger share of 
more fertile, cultivated land, carried more water per acre sold, were more likely to have 
riparian claims, and were more likely to be in a sellers’ pool.  Those farmers who were in 
the Keough pool also commanded the highest prices; sold the latest (held out the longest); 
and had more water per acre to offer Los Angeles.  Non-ditch properties sold for less.  
They typically had less productive land, carried fewer water rights, and were 
unorganized. Land owners not along ditches were more fragmented with no coordinating 
organization, and they negotiated individually with the Water Board.  These results are 
consistent with the implications presented in Section III.  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis and 
Table 4 reports 2SLS regression analysis of the year of sale and sale price per acre.  
Because some of the exogenous variables affecting year of purchase also likely 
influenced the final per acre sales price, the year of purchase variable is estimated first 
and then included in the price equation to address potential endogeneity.
87 Two 
instruments are included that affected the year of purchase, lagged precipitation deviation 
from normal in Los Angeles (generally negative) and lagged Los Angeles population 
change from the previous year.  Past drought conditions and population growth pressured 
the Water Board to subsequently acquire land and water rights.
88   
Following the implications listed above, the year-of-sale analysis is aimed at 
determining the characteristics of those farms that held out the longest to secure higher 
prices (especially, the role of sellers’ pools). The sale-price-per-acre analysis is aimed at   28 
determining the factors that influenced the price paid, again with concern on the impact 
of the pools.   
As suggested above, the productivity of a farm as indicated by the share in 
cultivation will delay purchase for two reasons:  Farms with more productive lands and 
success in agriculture had the option to delay agreement with the Water Board if they 
were dissatisfied with the offer price.  Additionally, valuation conflicts were greater for 
such farms because farmers and appraisers for the Water Board often had different 
assessments of the value of agricultural potential of the farms. Farms with higher 
cultivation shares will receive higher prices, all else equal. By contrast, low productivity 
farms were less controversial because their limited cultivation could be observed. Owners 
of such properties often were anxious to sell and would do so at lower prices.  The Water 
Board, however, will delay purchase of such lands because of their limited water.   
 Since the Water Board was interested ultimately in water, the amount of water 
acre feet per acre associated with the farm, as well as any riparian water rights will speed 
sale and raise the price paid for the land, all else equal.  Membership in sellers’ pools will 
delay sale, because the pools were formed to coordinate negotiations and to hold out for 
higher prices.  Drought conditions, as reflected in annual precipitation deviation from the 
mean in Los Angeles, also will speed sale because of demands on the Water Board to 
secure Los Angeles’ water supply. Because drought conditions were more likely to 
manifest by late summer, motivating the agency to more aggressively buy lands during 
the next year, the variable is lagged.  During the period of negotiations, the population of 
Los Angeles was growing more rapidly than expected, forcing the agency to buy more 
water-bearing lands.  Because population data became available at the end of the year,   29 
this variable also is lagged.  Farm size is included in the price-per-acre analysis as an 
additional control variable.  It should reduce the per-acre-sale price because smaller 
farms tended to have more valuable improvements, including buildings and specialty 
crops, such as orchards, that will drive up the price on small properties. 
Table 3 
Table 4 
As shown in panel 4a, as expected, farms with greater portions of their land in 
cultivation were sold later. An additional 10 percent of land in cultivation delayed sale by 
.14 year, or close to 2 months, relative to the mean year of purchase in the sample. 
Controlling for ditch location and pool membership, farmers with more water associated 
with their lands sold earlier, with every additional 10 acre feet of water per acre of land 
reducing sales time by about 1 year.  Riparian rights may have delayed sales, but the 
variable is not significant. Unfortunately, the effect of riparian rights on purchase time is 
not well captured in the regression because data on the amount of riparian water is not 
available. Only a dummy variable is used to indicate whether there were also riparian 
claims associated with the farm.  
Among the sellers’ pools, members of the Keough pool on average held out .8 
year, or 10 months longer than did those farmers not on ditches, who comprise the 
baseline.  Members of the Watterson and Cashbaugh pools, however, sold to the city 
earlier than did the Keough pool and earlier than non-ditch farmers who are the baseline 
(about .7 and .5 of a year earlier, respectively).  Farmers who were on ditches but not in 
pools also sold about .8 year earlier than the baseline group.  This outcome reflects the 
aggressive actions of the Water Board to buy ditch properties as soon as possible since   30 
they contained the most water.  For pools also, the Board attempted to entice members to 
defect and for non-pool members, the Board sought to complete agreements before the 
owners joined any pool.  For example, the Board convinced the leaders and largest land 
owners in the Watterson pool, Wilfred and Mark Watterson, to sell in 1926.  All but three 
of the other pool members followed, also selling in 1926. The remaining three holdouts 
sold in 1927.  
Cashbaugh pool members held out somewhat longer, but then sold quickly in 
1927 when the Board announced that it would subsequently be suspending further 
purchases.
89 As indicated below, Cashbaugh farmers earned somewhat less of a premium 
relative to non-ditch farms than did other ditch properties (pool and non-pool members) 
because they held out too long. This result reveals one of the hazards of holding out, 
since there was always the possibility that the Board would conclude it had sufficient 
water-bearing lands or that it did not have enough funds to complete further purchases. 
As it turned out, the Board resumed land purchases in 1929 as city water demand grew, 
but in 1927 there was uncertainty as to whether this would be the case. 
For non-pool ditch properties, the Board sought ownership as quickly as possible. 
For example, the Water Board bought virtually all of the farms on the McNally and Big 
Pine Ditches in 1923 and 1924 for $1,000,000 and $1,100,000, respectively to forestall 
their joining pools associated with the proposed Owens Valley Irrigation District.
90  
As shown in the table, previous precipitation shortfalls in Los Angeles below 
normal also speeded sales as did last year’s population change.  A 10-inch deviation in 
rainfall from normal speeded sales by about 1 year. During the drought of 1924, for   31 
example, precipitation was almost 9 inches below normal. An additional 100,000 people 
moved up sales by .1 of a year.   
Panel 4b reports regression estimates of the determinants of the price of land per 
acre. As shown in the table, as predicted the price paid per acre increased over time, with 
each year adding an average of about $32 per acre, reflecting the benefits of holding out 
for later sales, all else equal. Farmers with a higher portion of their land in cultivation 
also earned more, gaining about $0.85 per acre for every percentage point increase in 
share of cultivated acreage.  The available water acre feet/acre transferred with the 
property raised the sale price by almost $27 per acre with every additional acre/foot of 
water. As predicted, farm size reduced the per-acre sale price. Location of the farm on a 
mutual irrigation ditch and hence, shareholder in a ditch company raised sale prices 
relative to farms not located on ditches.   
Among ditch properties, members of the Keough pool earned about $200 more 
per acre than did the 228 non-ditch property owners and $111 more per acre than those 
farmers who were on ditches but not in pools. Members of the Watterson and Cashbaugh 
pools earned approximately $ 97 and $77 more per acre respectively than non-ditch 
farmers, with those in the Watterson pool earning about $8 more per acre than non-pool 
ditch farmers, but those in the Cashbaugh pool receiving approximately $12 less.  
Holding riparian water rights also appears to have had a positive effect on sales prices, 
although the variable is not significant.  
There is additional information for 135 farms in Owens Valley on farmer ask 
prices, Los Angeles bid prices, final prices paid, and appraisal values. Although the data 
are not consistently provided for all the observations across the groups there is enough   32 
information for further assessment of the relative effectiveness of pool members in their 
negotiations with the Water Board.    
Table 5 
The data in Table 5 are suggestive of the price adjustment process by the Board in 
bargaining with pool members. For the less effective Cashbaugh pool (in terms of the 
price premium shown in Table 4b), the price offered by the Water Board was virtually 
equal to the adjusted appraisal values (4.1 times appraisal according to the pricing rule), 
whereas for the more intransigent Keough pool members, the Board raised its offer by 45 
percent on average from the appraisal value in an effort to secure the properties.  
Table 6 
Table 6 reports the results of a regression of the ratio of the ask-to-final purchase 
price against a constant and a number of control variables, including pool membership for 
135 farms.  The results indicate that pool membership allowed those farm owners to get 
more than they initially asked for.  They were able to do so by successfully holding out 
for an even higher price, whenever the Board rejected their initial demands. The results 
confirm also that the Keough Pool was a stronger sellers’ group.  The mean ask-to-
purchase ratio for the entire group was 1.19.  The coefficient results suggest that a 
Keough pool member had a ask-to-final price ratio of .86 and a Cashbaugh member had a 
ratio of .98.   
All told, the analyses of the year of purchase, the purchase price per acre, and 
price negotiations are consistent with the implications drawn from the analytical 
framework outlined above.  They explain which properties were purchased first, which 
held out, which received the most per acre, and which gained the most in price   33 
negotiations.  They also indicate which properties would involve the most contentious 
negations in addressing valuation disputes and bi-lateral monopoly conditions in Owens 
Valley.  The negotiations over these properties helped to give the Owens Valley water 
transfer its contentious history.   
 V. Impact of the Water Transfer: An Assessment. 
Los Angeles spent more than $18,580,000 through 1934 for agricultural 
properties, and more that $5,800,000 for town parcels.
91 As Owens Valley lands were 
purchased by the Water Board and their water was sent down the aqueduct to Los 
Angeles, irrigated agriculture was replaced by livestock raising. Farms and ranches were 
leased from the Water Board and consolidated into larger ranches. The evidence suggests 
that land owners in Owens Valley did better in selling their water than if they had stayed 
in agriculture.  This assessment is in contrast to the usual view of the water and land sale 
as one of “theft” by Los Angeles.
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Census data reveal that between 1900, before the aqueduct was planned or had 
delivered any water, and 1930, when most farms were purchased, land values in Owens 
Valley rose by around a factor of 11, increasing from an average of $13 per acre to 
$143.
93 By contrast, land values in Lassen County, California, a similar Great Basin 
agricultural county, rose by a modest 2 times over the same 30-year period, from $10 per 
acre to $21. These data suggest that most of the rise in land values in Inyo County 
(Owens Valley) was due to land purchases by Los Angeles and not due to changes in 
agricultural commodity and livestock prices.  
Census data also provide further evidence of the gains from trading Owens Valley 
water. Between 1900 and 1930 the value of agricultural land and buildings in Los   34 
Angeles County rose by $407,051,000, an increase of nearly 600 percent, mostly due to 
the increased migration and development opportunities made possible by arrival of 
Owens Valley water.  During that same time period, the value of agricultural land and 
buildings in Inyo County rose by $11,568,000, also an increase of approximately 600 
percent.  By contrast, farm property values in Lassen County increased by $6,306,000, or 
172 percent from 1900.
94Again, the baseline Great Basin county does not do as well.   
The per capita gains are more startling.  The per capita gain in the value of 
agricultural land values in Los Angeles County in 1930 were $184 whereas those in Inyo 
County were $1,652.  Ignoring distributional effects, the residents of Owens Valley 
benefited from the water trade relative to both the residents of Los Angeles County and 
their counterparts in Lassen County, who remained in agriculture. 
If one uses property value data from the California State Board of Equalization a 
similar picture emerges.  Each year the Board of Equalization reported the “Grand Total 
Value of All Property” by county and municipality. The data include the value of real 
estate (farm and non-farm), improvements, personal property, money and solvent credits, 
and railroad assessments.
95 Between 1900 and 1930, the total value of all property in 
Lassen County rose by 640 percent; Inyo County rose 917 percent; and in Los Angeles 
County, by 4408 percent. While the growth in Los Angeles dwarfed that in the other two 
rural counties, the value of all property in Inyo County grew by 43% more than in Lassen 
County over the 10 year period of major Los Angeles land purchases in Owens Valley.   
An alternative way of assessing the impact of Owens Valley land sales is to 
consider the counterfactual of no Los Angeles purchase or export of Owens Valley water, 
the expansion of farm acreage in Inyo County at the same rate as occurred in Lassen   35 
County, and the same increase in land prices in Inyo as occurred in Lassen.  Under this 
plausible counterfactual, farm land values would have been $4,553,120 in 1930 in Owens 
Valley.
96  But this value is $7,000,000 less than what actually occurred.   
Regardless of how the gains are measured, Owens Valley land owners did better 
by selling to Los Angeles than remaining in irrigated agriculture, using Lassen County as 
a baseline.  Owens Valley land owners captured part of the aggregate gains of trade as 
did property owners in Los Angeles.  These data are indicative of the dramatic size of the 
aggregate benefits of this early water exchange, even when none of the increase in urban 
land values in Los Angeles is included.   
A broader comparison of the economic history of Inyo County with four other 
Great Basin counties also is instructive for examining the impact of the water transfer 
from Owens Valley to Los Angeles.  These counties were chosen because they have 
similar agricultural characteristics common to the Great Basin (Figure 3):  short growing 
seasons, relatively high transportation costs, alkaline soil, and limited rainfall.  Livestock 
raising and alfalfa growing are the principal agricultural crops. All four of the other 
counties have retained their water, and two, Churchill and Lyon, Nevada have received 
additional irrigation water from the Newlands Project, constructed between 1903 and 
1917.  Lassen County, like Inyo, was denied a Bureau of Reclamation irrigation project.
97 
Table 7 
Table 7 provides summary census data for two census periods, 1910 prior to the 
Owens Valley water transfer and 1930, when most of the farm transactions had been 
completed. As indicated in the table the purchase of farms by the Los Angeles Water 
Board and the export of water reduced the number of farms in Inyo County and increased   36 
farm size relative to the other counties. The period corresponded with a small decline in 
population. Of most interest is the value of land and buildings per farm acre.  Notice the 
run up in prices in Inyo County between 1910 and 1930 compared to what occurred 
elsewhere.  For instance, in 1930, per farm and per farm acre land values in Inyo County 
were $62,200 and $143, respectively, up almost 5 fold from 1910 for per farm values and 
almost 3 fold for 1910 per acre values.  No other county had anything close to this 
increase in value.
98 This pattern most certainly reflects the purchases of farm properties 
by the Water Board, since there are no other indications of productivity change. This 
evidence supports the claim of the Board that it was paying well above market rates for 
Owens Valley properties. These mean values also reflect the effects of the holdout 
strategies of the sellers’ pools.  In terms of the value of farm production, crop and 
livestock production, Inyo grew less rapidly than did the other counties, and shifted more 
dramatically from crops to livestock raising, a pattern consistent with a movement from 
irrigated agriculture. 
In total, the census and state Board of Equalization data suggest a more positive 
bargaining outcome than is commonly suggested for Owens Valley.  The export of water 
reduced crop production as a share of overall agricultural output and encouraged a shift 
toward livestock.  But this pattern also took place in the other counties. The comparative 
advantage of the Great Basin ultimately was in livestock, so there would have been a 
gradual shift from crops in Owens Valley, even had the aqueduct not been built. Owens 
Valley was not left a wasteland as is sometimes alleged.  Nor would its small orchards 
and other crops that were grown through 1920 likely to have remained competitive for 
the longer term had the water remained in the valley.  The export of water did change   37 
agriculture and life in Owens Valley, but it was not dominantly a negative change, nor 
was it decidedly different from that which occurred in agriculture throughout the Great 
Basin.  
V. Concluding Remarks:  Lessons of Owens Valley for Understanding the 
Transaction Costs of Water Transfers. 
   
The largest voluntary water exchange from agriculture to urban uses in U.S. 
history was the Owens Valley water transfer to Los Angeles, negotiations for which 
began almost 100 years ago.  The purchase of private land and water rights by the city of 
Los Angeles took about 30 years to complete after hotly-contested negotiations, periodic 
episodes of violence, and occasional intervention by the California Governor’s office and 
the State Legislature, all of which attracted national and international attention.  The 
benefits to Los Angeles of the exchange included an increase in the value of agricultural 
land alone of over $400 million with aggregate urban land values likely rising several 
multiples of this amount. Owens Valley water certainly made the subsequent growth of 
Los Angeles possible. The benefits to Owens Valley land owners in terms of the increase 
in agricultural land values were approximately $12 million, about $7 million more than 
they likely would have received had the region stayed in irrigated agriculture.  And on a 
per capita basis, Owens Valley residents received about 10 times per person from the 
water and land exchange as did the residents of Los Angeles County ($1,652 per person, 
compared to $184). 
Nevertheless, the legacy of the transfer has been a very negative one, so much so 
that Owens Valley has become a metaphor for opposing water markets and the transfer of 
water from agriculture to urban and environmental uses.
99One reason for the legacy is the 
imbalance in the distribution of the total, if not per capita, returns that underscores the   38 
“theft” claim.  The overall gains to Los Angeles were 40 times or more those of Owens 
Valley from the redistribution of water.  When the gains from trade are unexpectedly 
enormous, distributional issues move to the forefront.  Although the Los Angeles 
aqueduct was constructed to augment the city’s water supply, no one in 1913 could have 
anticipated the population growth that subsequently took place.  The reallocation of 
Owens Valley water was a huge windfall, with its magnitude perhaps unexpected.  While 
Owens Valley farmers were made better off than they otherwise would have been had 
they remained in irrigated agriculture, as a group they did not capture the major portion 
of the aggregate gains from trade.  Ex post many of their advocates were bitter about this 
distributional outcome.  In general, it may be that trades are smooth when the gains are 
generally known and the resulting returns reasonably equal. But they are less likely to be 
completed, or result in real acrimony, when the gains turn out to be much larger than 
anticipated with a distribution that is very skewed toward one party.
100   
The bargaining framework also suggests why the Owens Valley negotiations were 
so rancorous, with such a negative legacy. The lands were heterogeneous and there were 
intense debates over valuation and hence, individual shares of the observed potential 
gains from trade described above.
101 The most contentious negotiations took place within 
bi-lateral monopoly conditions. Neither party could leave the exchange, but both had 
sharply different prices in mind, with the most valuable properties, carrying the most 
water, holding out for higher prices than initially offered by the Water Board. The price 
gaps also were not easily narrowed because of information limits and uncertainties about 
the value of water in Owens Valley and Los Angeles, about the amount of water Los 
Angeles ultimately would require, and about how much irrigated agriculture could be   39 
sustained in the valley.  Further, the gaps could not be quickly narrowed because of a lack 
of trust between the parties that made them suspicious of the offers of both sides with 
little means of resolving the suspicion.  And there were third-party effects on the towns 
and uncertainty about their significance and the legality of purchases of those properties 
by Los Angeles.  Given the overall decline in agriculture in the Great Basin and the 
country in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the countering impact of Los Angeles’ 
investments in highways and recreation facilities, these third-party effects may have been 
comparatively small in fact, although they played an important role in bargaining 
posturing.  
The economic surpluses that new water generated in Los Angeles County were so 
large that the Water Board might have taken a more liberal approach in its pricing 
policies, allowing for more active use of binding arbitration.  This of course, would have 
driven the agency from its strict pricing rule and required additional bond issues.  Had the 
Board purchased farm and town properties more rapidly and at higher prices, the Owens 
Valley transfer might not have the harmful reputation it enjoys today.  But such a 
counterfactual supposes that Los Angeles taxpayers would have supported higher bond 
issues and that the Board agents could have resisted even higher price demands from 
Owens Valley land owners, especially those with the greatest water to offer.  Neither was 
likely.  
To improve their bargaining position relative to that of the Los Angeles Water 
Board, Owens Valley land owners appealed to the press and to the California legislature.  
The image of rural farmers battling large urban interests fit well within the tradition of 
progressive, muckraking news reporting, and it sold papers even if the story was not a   40 
balanced nor necessarily factual one.  Further, political representatives of other rural 
communities with a stake in the bargaining outcome, as well as those who represented 
northern California jurisdictions with concerns about a political shift toward a rapidly 
growing southern California, provided ready allies in condemning the negotiating tactics 
of the Water Board.  
Allegations of water theft and desolation of Owens Valley began to take lives of 
their own after 1930. They were repeated in Mayo’s 1933 history of Los Angeles, novels, 
and later in the 1950s in other works on western water.
102 Additionally, there were 
environmental controversies beginning in the 1970s due to the drawdown of the water 
levels of Mono Lake after the aqueduct was extended north to the Mono Basin in 1940 
and from dust storms originating from the (now) dry Owens Lake bed.
103  In these 
environmental disputes critics of Los Angeles repeatedly returned to the ‘theft’ of Owens 
Valley water as the source of the problem.  All of these factors help explain the notoriety 
of the Owens Valley water transfer and why the prevailing negative assessment of it casts 
such a pall over current efforts to reallocate water to urban uses from agriculture.     41 
 
Table 1 
Chronology of Los Angeles-Owens Valley Land and Water Negotiations 
Year  Events 
1898-1902    Concern about the water supply as a break on the growth of Los Angeles. 
 Los Angeles population 250,000 
1903-09  Los Angeles Water Board quietly buys 22,670 acres of land in southern Owens Valley. 
Later purchases more lands, mostly from federal government in southern Owens Valley. 
Owns 82,000 acres. Little controversy.  
1903-07  Reclamation Service considers and then abandons irrigation project in Owens Valley.  
Los Angeles obtains federal right of way for aqueduct.   
1907-10  Bond issues approved for aqueduct and power generation. 
Los Angeles population 319,187 
1913-20  Aqueduct completed; most water directed to San Fernando Valley, which is annexed. Land 
values jump. Limited impact on agriculture in Owens Valley. 
1920  Los Angeles population 576,637.  
1922  Drought. Bond issue passes. Water Board begins buying land in northern Owens Valley.  
1923-24  Conflict over price. Sellers’ prices reflect water value in LA, not local appraised values. 
Board’s offers based on local use. Sellers’ pools form: Keough Pool on Owens River 
Canal, and Cashbaugh and Watterson Pools on Bishop Creek Canal. Board focuses on non-
pool lands, seeks defectors.  
Aqueduct dynamited; spillway opened, releasing water to desert; risk to water supply.  
State and national press coverage of  “California’s Little Civil War.”  
Owens Valley and Big Pine Reparations Associations form to demand compensation as the 
agricultural economy declines. Appeal to state and national press  
1925  Los Angeles population 1,192,000. 
When flowing, aqueduct at half capacity due to drought. 
1925-29  Contentious negotiations for land and water rights continue. Board retains 4 times appraisal 
rule for setting prices and paying same price for comparable lands.  Sellers object that 
properties are dissimilar and that prices do not reflect city water values. 
Aqueduct and city wells dynamited. Periodic diversion of city water.  
Board halts purchases of additional property in Owens Valley in 1927. 
Two sellers’ pools sell out, one remains. 
Taxpayer concerns about high payments for land in Owens Valley. 
1930  Los Angeles population 2,208,492. 
1931-33  Board begins to purchase town properties.    
Aqueduct dynamited.   
Los Angeles owns 95% of farm properties and 85% of town properties. 
 Keough Pool purchases completed. 
 
 
   42 
 
Table 2 
Owens Valley Farm Property Characteristics, Mean Values 
Property 
Type 

















$198.22  1926  .17  3.66  154  .35  595 
Farms on 
Ditches 
$270.65  1926  .21  5.18  121  .37  367 
Farms Not 
on Ditch 









$241.80  1927  .14  4.42  126  .19  43 
Watterson 
Pool 
$237.00  1926  .21  3.86  147  .25  20 
*Properties 10 acres or larger purchased by Los Angeles between 1916 and 1934.  Smaller properties were 
not farms, but town lots and addressed separately:   “Tabulation Showing Status of Ranch Land Purchases 
Made by the City of Los Angeles in the Owens River Drainage Area from 1916 to April 1934,” Prepared in 
Right of Way and Land Division by Clarence S. Hill, Right of Way and Land Agency, Compiled by E.H. 
Porter, April 16, 1934, LADWP Archives. 
1Records in the LADWP Archives indicate that the Keough pool had 30 members and the Cashbaugh pool, 
48, but not all are in the data set for analysis because of missing information. 
 
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  
 (595 observations) 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Land Price/acre
  $198.22  $163.38  $3.00  $954.90 
Year of Purchase  1926  1.87  1917  1932 
Cultivation Fraction  0.17  0.26  0  1.00 
Farm Size (acres)  154  267  10  3,502 
Water/acre (acre feet/acre)  3.66  3.10  0  16.5 
Riparian Rights (Y/N)  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Keough Pool (Y/N)  0.04  0.19  0  1 
Cashbaugh Pool (Y/N)  0.07  0.26  0  1 
Watterson Pool (Y/N)  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Other Ditch (non-pool) (Y/N)  0.47  0.50  0  1 
LA Annual Population Change (000) 
1916-1934 
123  75  23  283 
LA Annual Precipitation Deviation 
from Mean in inches (1910-40) 
0.11  4.98  -8.51  4.25   43 
Table 4 
Determinants of Year of Purchase and Price Received Per Acre 
a.) First Stage Results 
DV = Year of Purchase 
Variable  Coefficient  SE 
Constant  1928.28*
  0.21 
% of Farm Cultivatedt  1.43*  0.26 
Water Acre Feet /Acret    -0.10*  0.03 
Total Farm Acrest  -0.0001  0.0002 
Riparian Rightst  0.15  0.14 
Member of Keough Poolt  0.79**  0.37 
Member of Cashbaugh Poolt  -0.46***  0.27 
Member of Watterson Poolt  -0.66***  0.37 
Farms on Ditches but not in Poolt  -0.84
*  0.18 
Precipitation Deviationt-1  0.10
*  0.01 
LA Annual Population Growtht-1  -0.01
*  0.002 
  595 obs. , R
2 = .33, F(10,584) = 29.62   
*significant at the 1% level or better. 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at the 10% level 
 
b.) Second Stage Results 
DV = price per acre 
Variable  Coefficient  SE 
Constant  -61,473.46
*  10,957.97 
Estimated Year of Purchaset  31.93
*  5.69 
% of Farm Cultivatedt  85.07
*  19.74 
Water Acre Feet /Acret    27.99
*  1.91 
Total Farm Acrest  -0.05
*  0.02 
Riparian Rightst  -0.92  9.63 
Member of Keough Poolt  199.62
*  24.75 
Member of Cashbaugh Poolt  77.03
*  18.18 
Member of Watterson Poolt  96.61
*  24.96 
Farms on Ditches but not in Poolt  89.25
*  13.30 
  595 obs. , R
2 = .61, F(9,585) = 100.61   
*significant at the 1% level or better. 
Table 5 
Analysis of Bid Prices and Appraisal Values by Owner Group 




Mean Ratio of LA 






Source:  LADWP Archives, Tape GX0008, Appraisal Files, “McNally Ditch Stockholders;” Tape 
GX0004, “Sale of Lands, 1920-27 File,” Keough Pool, Owens River Canal;  Miscellaneous File, 
Appraisal and Ask Values; 1927 Appraisal Values; Tape GX0001, “Fish Slough File,” Cashbaugh 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Ask to Final Purchase Price by Owner Group 
D.V.=Ratio of Ask Price to Final Purchase Price 
Variable  Coefficient  SE 
Constant  -86.37  28.56 
Total Farm Acres  -0.0002  0.0002 
Year of Purchase  0.05  0.01 
Keough Pool   -0.33  0.12 
Cashbaugh Pool  -0.21  0.11 
  135 Obs. , R





Census Data for Five Great Basin Counties 






Value of  Land and 
Buildings/Acre 
(Current $) 
County  1910  1930  1910  1930  1910  1930  1910  1930 
Inyo  438  218  251  434  6,974  6,555  52  143 
Lassen  502  472  589  1,003  4,802  12,589  24  21 
Churchill  354  614  320  144  2,811  5,075  27  80 
Douglas  132  135  638  1,084  1,895  1,840  36  41 
Lyon  208  339  508  554  3,568  3,810  32  40 
Source:   U.S. Census, Land and Building Values per Acre from Barnard and Jones (1987). 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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1 Letter, September 22, 1924 to the Grand Jury of Inyo County from WW. Yandell and Ione Seymoure of 
the Farmers Ditch Company regarding Los Angeles purchase of McNally Ditch. Tape GX0007, Town 
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2 For discussion of contemporary water problems, especially groundwater drawdown, see Glennon (2002). 
Water transfer issues are discussed in a larger literature.  It includes, among others, Anderson and Snyder 
(1997), Rose (1990), Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981), and Kanazawa (2003).  
3 See, Dean E. Murphy, “Pact in West will Send Farms’ Water to Cities, New York Times.com, October 
17, 2003. 
4 Ostrom (1953, 127).  Some of the farms had riparian water rights as well, which were acquired with the 
properties. 
5See for example, article by Henry Osborne in the Scientific American 1913, as well as Nadeau (1950, 45-
60), Ostrom (1971, 447-8), Department of Public Service, 1916, Complete Report on Construction of the 
Los Angeles Aqueduct. 17-29. 
6 Ostrom (1953, 23). 
7 Los Angeles’ growth might have occurred later with advent of Colorado River water beginning in the 
early 1940s.  But with a much smaller Los Angeles, the political negotiations behind construction of 
Hoover Dam and the California and Colorado Canals, bringing Colorado River water to California, might 
have been quite different.   
8 For discussion of the impact of Owens Valley water on Los Angeles, see Kahrl (1982, 227-230). 
9 Kahrl (1982, 230). 
10 A search of the Westlaw “ALLNEWS” data base of Owens Valley provides large and negative press 
accounts, generally repeating assertions of transforming a verdant agricultural valley into a waste land.  The 
articles are usually in the context of more recent environmental conflicts between Los Angeles and 
advocates for more water for Mono Lake.  
11 The perception of land theft and community destruction continues in the press. For example, see New 
York Times, August 8, 2004, p. 14, “Los Angeles Mayor Seeks to Freeze Valley Growth. Centry-Old Land 
Grab Still Contentious,” by John M. Broder. 
12 Bond issues:  1905 for right of way; 1907 for the aqueduct; 1925, $1,150,000 of $8,000,000 for Owens 
Valley 1926, $6,000,000 of $10,000,000 for Owens Valley, 1930 where $6 million of $38,800,000 was for 
Owens Valley. See John S. Myers, Controller, History of Bonded Indebtedness of the City of Los Angeles 
California, May 1895 to December 31, 1927 and Tape EJ00083, Reports 1931-32, May 20, 1930, 
tabulation of $38,800,000 bond issue. 
13 Beginning in 1903, the Los Angeles Board of Water and Power Commissioners was made up of five 
members, appointed by the mayor to staggered terms and confirmed by the City Council.  The Board had 
authority to set water rates, purchase properties, and manage water bond funds, among other 
responsibilities.  There also was a permanent staff that included the Chief Engineer.  Throughout the 
discussion the reference is to the Los Angeles Water Board. The Board had several designations over the 
period, ranging from the Water and Public Service Commission to the Water and Power Commission to the 
Department of Water and Power. See Kahrl (1982, 17) 
14 The analysis also relies on the existing literature, especially Hoffman (1982), Kahrl (1982), Ostrom 
(1953), Miller (1977), Nadeau (1950), Walton (1992) and Sauder (1994). 
15 The Los Angeles Board of Water Commissioners in its Annual Report for 1904 noted that local sources 
beyond the Los Angeles river were too limited to be of much help and that the city would have to find more 
remote supplies of water (1904, 25). 
16 Mean precipitation for Los Angeles, 1921-2002 from 
www.nwsla.noaa.gov/climate/data/cqt_monthprecip_cy.txt and mean for Chicago, 1871-2003 from 
home.att.net/~chicago_climo/CHIPRCP.gif . 
17 Ostrom (1953, 23) provides data on the various sources of water for Los Angeles, 1920-1950. 
18 Miller (1977, 49-50). 
19 1920 U.S. Census. 
20 1925 U.S. Agricultural Census; Ostrom (1953, 118) for irrigation acreage in1910.  See also, Walter 
Packard, “The Future Agricultural Development of Owens Valley,” January 22, 1925, Tape GX0004, 
Special Owens Valley File, LADWP Archives.    53 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 Miller (1977, 53-55). The agricultural potential of Owens Valley generally is exaggerated in the 
literature.  Kahrl (1982, 38) for example, inappropriately compares it to the Imperial Valley, which has 
good soil, better drainage, and at sea level, virtually year-round growing conditions. 
22 “Classified Acreage of Lands Under Ditch, Bishop-Big Pine Region of Owens Valley, Based on Surveys 
by City of Los Angeles, 1922 to 1926" Tape GX0004, Misc. File, LADWP Archives.  Water was 
apportioned among farmers on a ditch in proportion to their shares in the ditch company.  For discussion of 
ditch companies, see Israelsen, Maughan, and South (1946).  Mutual ditch companies were organized by 
farmers who held stock in them and the companies generally held the water rights of the stockowners. 
Expenses were met by annual assessments.  See also By-laws of the McNally Ditch Company, GX0008, 
McNally Ditch File, LADWP Archives.  
23 Tape GX0004, Miscellaneous File, “Classified Acreage of Lands Under Ditch…1922-1926.” LADWP 
Archives.  
24 Miller (1977, 44-56). 
25 Tape GX0007, Owens Valley Lands file, Report to Ralph Criswell of Owen Valley Lands, August 6, 
1927 from John T. Martin, Right of Way and Land Agent and “Tabulation Showing Status of Ranch Land 
Purchases Made by the City of Los Angeles in the Owens River Drainage Area from 1916 to April 1934,” 
Prepared in Right of Way and Land Division by Clarence S. Hill, Right of Way and Land Agency, 
Compiled by E.H. Porter, April 16, 1934, Tape GX0004, LADWP Archives.   
26 Hoffman (1982, 141-54), Kahrl (1982, 90-103), Ostrom (1953, 149-54) describes bond issues in 1907, 
sources of opposition, outrage over land speculation in San Fernando Valley, conflict over annexation, and 
disputes between the city and private power and water companies over compensation for their properties.  
27 As dramatized in the movie, “Chinatown.  A short summary of the scandal over insider land purchases is 
provided in Ostrom (1953, 58,149-51), Kahrl (1982, 195) and Nadeau (1950, 29-41). 
28 Nadeau (1950, 29) noted that property values in much of Los Angeles doubled in price in 1905 when the 
Owens Valley project was announced. 
29 Kahrl (1982, 170), Hoffman (1982, 154-53), and Ostrom (153, 149-51) describe early water distribution. 
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of Inyo County from WW. Yandell and Ione Seymoure of the Farmers Ditch Company regarding Los 
Angeles purchase of McNally Ditch, Tape GX0007, Town Properties File, LADWP Archives.  See also 
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